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Abstract
The return of the Irish Republic to economic growth after years of reces-
sion has been hailed as a vindication of the country’s adherence to strict 
austerity policies after the crash. In this article, we provide a critical 
reading of this familiar rendition of the recent turn in Ireland’s economic 
fortunes. We argue that the discourse of ‘recovery’ is an ideologically 
partisan reading that distorts the scale, origins and benefits of the recent 
spell of growth in the Irish economy. A close examination of each of these 
distortions suggests that the current economic revival has occurred in 
spite, rather than because, of the austerity strategy and has resulted in 
the lives of many ordinary Irish people becoming not better but worse.
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Introduction
In recent years, the Irish Republic has emerged from a period of profound 
recession and begun to record once more the highest rates of economic growth 
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in Europe. A sequence of powerful political figures has been at pains to depict 
the seemingly dramatic turn in Ireland’s fortunes as vindication of the painful 
austerity measures introduced in the country during the global financial crisis 
(Coulter et al., 2017). While this reading of the Irish ‘recovery’ has gained 
widespread currency, it is one that fails to stand up under closer examination. 
The often glowing appraisals that have come to surround the Irish Republic 
have, of course, substantial grounding in fact. Nonetheless, the construction 
of Ireland as the unqualified success story of the Eurozone crisis represents a 
reading of events that is at best partial and problematic. In this article, we set 
out to provide a closer and more critical examination of the course that Irish 
society has taken since the onset of the global economic recession. This leads 
us to suggest that the increasingly pervasive narrative of ‘recovery’ serves in 
fact to distort the scale, origins and benefits of the recent apparent upturn in 
the Irish economy. Before we turn to set out each of these distortions in turn, 
it might be prudent to provide a necessarily brief account of developments 
in Ireland since the crash for readers unfamiliar with that particular context.
Ireland since the crash
The onset of the global economic crisis would affect Ireland rather more 
gravely than most other developed societies. In the period between 2007 and 
2010, Irish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by 21%, by some 
estimates the most severe economic collapse ever experienced in a wealthy 
country in peacetime (Donovan and Murphy, 2013). The relative vulnerabil-
ity of Ireland’s economy derived primarily from the profligacy of a domestic 
banking sector whose reckless lending had fueled one of the steepest property 
bubbles on record (Allen and O’Boyle, 2013: 3). As the fragility of the indig-
enous financial system became painfully apparent in the autumn of 2008, 
the government issued a guarantee covering all the loans issued to six Irish 
banks (Dukelow and Kennett, 2018: 492). Even this dramatic socialisation 
of private debt would prove insufficient, however, to stem the flow of funds 
haemorrhaging from the Irish financial system. Over the next two years, the 
Irish government would sink ever larger amounts of public money into the 
banks until the total eventually settled at the astronomical figure of €64 bil-
lion (McCabe, 2013: 165).
The bank bailout placed even greater, and ultimately unbearable, pressure 
on an Irish state that was reeling from the collapse of the housing market. As 
the once lucrative taxes on property all but disappeared and the social welfare 
bill soared to support the tens of thousands of construction workers, among 
others, who had recently lost their jobs, a deficit appeared in the public coffers 
that would ultimately reach the ‘unheard of’ (Donovan and Murphy, 2013: 
103) level of 31% of GDP. Attempting to bridge the void, the Irish gov-
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ernment introduced austerity measures between 2008 and 2010 amounting 
to €15 billion, but even these draconian steps would prove insufficient. In 
the closing weeks of 2010, as the state teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, 
the Irish government bowed to growing pressure and applied for emergency 
funds from the ‘troika’ institutions of the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank. A country that had 
in the recent past been hailed as ‘Europe’s shining light’ (Donovan and Mur-
phy, 2013: 15) was now forced to take its place among that body of heavily 
indebted European states that had come to be identified by the unflattering 
acronym of the ‘PIIGS’ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain).
The terms of the deal struck between the troika and the Irish government 
would see the three bodies advance €67.5 billion in emergency loans over the 
next three years. It would become commonplace to refer to this arrangement 
as a ‘bailout’, a term whose genial connotations suggest that the financial 
assistance involved represented an act of selfless benevolence. The reality was 
rather different. The funds loaned to the Irish state came at punitive interest 
rates, disappeared mainly (€35 billion) into the voracious European banking 
system and afforded the creditor institutions the power to dictate government 
policy for years to come (Kirby, 2012: 256). This newfound influence would 
be employed to compound an austerity regime already bringing widespread 
hardship to Irish society (Meade, 2018). Further draconian budgets would 
see the introduction of ‘a shocking array’ (Oxfam, 2013: 1) of measures that 
diminished or eliminated forms of social welfare previously considered to be 
untouchable. The inevitable outcome was a sharp rise in social deprivation. 
Between 2008 and 2014 the proportion of Irish citizens experiencing ‘mate-
rial deprivation’ – that is, those unable to secure two or more of 11 items 
essential for living such as adequate clothing and shelter – rose from 14% to 
29% (European Anti-Poverty Network Ireland, 2015: 4). Perhaps the starkest 
illustration of the privations that marked the austerity era can be found in the 
rise of food poverty, especially among the young. According to one authori-
tative study (Gavin et al., 2015), in 2014 one in five children in Ireland – a 
country that, for all its recent travails, remains one of the richest in the world 
– regularly were going to school or bed hungry.
Three distortions of the Irish ‘recovery’
Those who installed the austerity regime in Ireland have tended towards forms 
of talk that are dispassionate and technocratic. Measures that brought penury 
to many Irish citizens were invariably cast as necessary evils that would pre-
pare the ground for economic renewal and in time confer most benefit on 
those whom they appeared to have caused most harm. The specific promise 
of renewed prosperity at the heart of the austerity project would seem, at first 
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glance at least, to have come to pass in an Irish context. In December 2013, 
Ireland became the first Eurozone member to leave the troika’s ‘bailout’ pro-
gramme and soon began registering rates of economic growth reminiscent of 
the Celtic Tiger boom. After years of economic crisis, Irish politicians have, 
understandably, been keen to herald the apparent turn in Ireland’s fortunes. 
In January 2016, the then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Enda Kenny used his 
appearance at the annual gathering of global power and wealth in Davos to 
suggest that Ireland had ‘set a model’ for other countries seeking to navigate 
the perilous waters of global recession (Young, 2016). The seeming return 
of Ireland to economic health has also been greeted with acclaim among 
the global political and financial elite. German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
(Lynch, 2015) and Managing Director of the IMF Christine Lagarde (Car-
swell, 2015) have lauded frequently the economic progress that the country 
appears to have made over recent years. Even the habitually taciturn figure of 
Wolfgang Schäuble – the powerful German Finance Minister who presided 
over the Eurozone crisis before becoming President of the Bundestag in 2017 
- was moved to comment that his fellow citizens are ‘jealous’ of the rates of 
economic growth that Ireland has registered since the ‘bailout’ arrangements 
came to an end (O’Hora and Kelpie, 2014).
In the wake of several years of economic chaos in Ireland, it was always 
entirely predictable that the advent of a ‘recovery’ would be greeted with 
euphoria, in official circles at least. Once we move beyond the surface level 
of headline rates of GDP growth, however, the apparent transformation at 
work within the Irish economy turns out to be rather more complex than its 
celebrants in the mainstream media would suggest. The official narrative of 
‘recovery’ transpires to be an ideologically partisan reading that distorts the 
scale, origins and benefits of the current apparent upswing in Ireland’s eco-
nomic fortunes. In the discussion that follows, we will examine each of these 
distortions in turn.
Distorting the scale of the ‘recovery’
The often euphoric discourse of ‘recovery’ seriously overstates the scale of the 
economic progress that Ireland has made since leaving the troika programme. 
Over the last 30 years, the Irish state has set out to attract a new genera-
tion of American multinational corporations seeking to invest in Europe. 
The success of this strategy is indexed in the fact that nine out of ten of the 
world’s leading companies in the fields of both pharmaceuticals and infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT) have chosen to invest in the 
Irish Republic (Kinsella, 2014; Dublin Chamber of Commerce, 2018). The 
appeal of Ireland to these transnational corporations hinges crucially on a rate 
of corporation tax that officially stands at 12.5% but in effect often runs at 
dramatically lower levels. While the fiscal generosity that Ireland extends 
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to certain multinational concerns has been under scrutiny for some time, it 
has more recently become a matter of genuine international controversy. On 
30 August 2016, the European Commission (2016) launched a summary of 
its widely anticipated report into the relationship between Ireland and the 
US corporation Apple. The ruling issued in Brussels notes that over the last 
quarter of a century successive Dublin governments have maintained a fiscal 
regime allowing the global technology giant to avoid its tax obligations not 
only in the Irish Republic but also in several other European countries. In 
2014, for instance, the global brand paid an effective rate of tax to the Irish 
state that was a scarcely believable 0.005%. It is little wonder, then, that a 
major recent report identified Ireland as the world’s foremost corporate ‘tax 
haven’ (Tørsløv et al., 2018).
The tax avoidance strategies in which multinational corporations engage 
tend to give the impression that rather greater levels of economic activity are 
happening in Ireland than is actually the case. In most circumstances, the 
statistical distortions that arise out of the country’s status as a small, open, 
low-tax economy pass with little critical commentary. When in recent years 
the rate of economic growth was recorded in the mid-single digits these fig-
ures were recited in public commentary as though they were uncontroversial 
statements of ‘fact.’ On certain occasions, however, the creative accountancy 
of the multinationals operating in Ireland accelerates in ways that lay bare 
the fictitious nature of official statistics for all to see. One such moment came 
in the summer of 2016 when the Central Statistics Office (CSO) announced 
that during the previous year the national economy had expanded by 26.3%. 
These transparently preposterous figures were greeted with howls of derision 
from many economic commentators with Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman even 
moved to dust off an unfortunate cultural stereotype in order to dismiss the 
data as ‘leprechaun economics’ (Kelpie, 2016).
The controversial data published by the CSO highlight even more clearly 
than before the absolute centrality of multinational capital in the Irish 
economy. Almost all of the economic growth that Ireland formally recorded 
in 2015 was due to the strategies of transnational corporations seeking to 
avoid tax liabilities in other countries. For instance, during that year Apple 
decided to relocate a tranche of its intellectual property operations to the 
Irish Republic to avail of new generous tax breaks on such assets, with the 
aircraft leasing firm Aercap adopting a similar strategy with most of its €39 
billion assets worldwide (Burke-Kennedy, 2016). While these activities give 
the impression of rapid progress in Ireland, in practice they add little to the 
real productive economy. Once the distortions arising out of the tax avoid-
ance strategies of multinational capital are removed, the official estimate of 
Irish economic growth declines to a rather less vertiginous level. As the con-
troversy instigated by the implausible data released by the CSO threatened 
to escalate further, the Irish government sought to deflect allegations it was 
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engaged in fraudulent national accounting by disclosing that in 2015 GDP 
per capita had ‘really’ expanded by between 3.5% and 4% (Burke-Kennedy 
et al., 2016). Even this dramatically revised estimate is likely, however, to 
have overstated substantially the true performance of the Irish economy, fail-
ing as it does to filter out the critical distortions associated with the recent 
arrival of global finance houses in the domestic property market, an issue to 
which we will return shortly.
The widespread derision heaped upon Ireland’s national accounts (Kelpie, 
2016) has prompted the Dublin administration to adopt a supplementary 
measure of economic growth. In July 2017, the CSO unveiled the first batch 
of data using ‘modified gross national income’ (GNI), a metric designed to fil-
ter out the ‘statistical noise’ associated with multinational corporations’ cre-
ative accountancy practices. These figures underlined even further just how 
unreliable the more conventional measures of economic performance are in 
an Irish context. While the standard metric of GDP indicates that the Irish 
economy aggregates to around €275 billion, this estimate falls dramatically 
to €190 billion when the GNI methodology is deployed instead (Burke-Ken-
nedy, 2017a). The latter statistical procedure may well give a rather more 
accurate reading of the ‘true’ level of economic activity in Ireland, but to date 
it appears to have gained little real traction in national debate.
Over recent decades, the veracity of GDP as a gauge of economic prog-
ress has come under sustained criticism. The quite fantastic economic sta-
tistics that have emerged from Ireland recently have offered ammunition to 
those making the case for abandoning the metric altogether. In a recent major 
publication, for instance, the Irish experience is offered time and again as an 
exemplar of the problems that arise when states adopt GDP as a barometer 
of economic performance (Stiglitz et al., 2018). While the metric continues 
to receive widespread criticism, this has barely reduced its influence in the 
public realm. We conducted a LexisNexis search to examine how often the 
pair of economic measures under discussion have appeared in Ireland’s two 
leading newspapers since that moment in July 2016 when allegations of spu-
rious national accounts first surfaced. In the period to 15 December 2018, the 
phrase ‘(modified) gross national income’ was used on 86 occasions in the Irish 
Independent and the Irish Times. In contrast, the term ‘gross domestic product’ 
appeared in 998 stories in the country’s two leading dailies.
The data reported here suggest that while GDP has come in for sustained 
criticism lately, it has retained its status as the metric that exerts most influ-
ence in Irish economic commentary. This was illustrated in December 2017 
when it was announced that over the previous year Ireland’s economy had 
grown by the remarkable of figure of 10.5%. Mainstream media reports of 
the announcement admittedly offered caveats that GDP represents a less than 
reliable metric of ‘real’ economic growth (Burke-Kennedy, 2017b). In spite of 
these qualifications, however, the optimistic coverage that accompanied Ire-
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land’s latest raft of national accounts suggests that this particular discredited 
metric of economic performance retains its power to frame public commen-
tary in the country. The resilience of GDP as the headline economic metric 
has no little ideological significance. In its tendency to overstate the scale of 
the Irish ‘recovery’ the statistical procedure provides powerful figures with 
an instantly legible metric that appears to vindicate their claim that only by 
following the difficult path of austerity can states hope to return to economic 
prosperity once more.
Distorting the origins of the ‘recovery’
Those who have been most ardent in acclaiming Ireland’s ‘recovery’ not only 
overstate its scale, but also often misunderstand its origins. As Blyth (2013) 
notes, influential voices sought from the outset to connect the global economic 
crash to what were presumed to be excessive labour costs and public spend-
ing. Given the origins of the crisis, their logic went, a return to economic 
growth would require a period of wage cuts on the part of workers and fiscal 
prudence on the part of states. The country widely held to have embraced 
most decisively the deceptively quotidian logic of the austerity school was 
of course the Irish Republic. From the outset of the global economic crisis, 
Irish administrations set about cutting public spending and raising taxes with 
what some commentators have deemed almost ‘indecent enthusiasm’ (Boyle 
and Wood, 2017: 88).
The commitment of the Irish government to austerity would find per-
haps its clearest expression in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ struck 
with the troika institutions in December 2010 (Department of Finance, 
2010). Under the terms of the deal, the Irish state committed to embark on 
an ‘ambitious’ programme of ‘fiscal consolidation’ amounting to €15 bil-
lion over the next three years. Two thirds of this ‘budgetary correction’ was 
to be achieved through radical cuts in public spending that would lead to 
30,000 public sector workers losing their jobs, major infrastructural proj-
ects being abandoned and levels of social welfare falling substantially. The 
impact of these welfare cuts would be felt with particular force by those 
who lost their jobs during the recession. The budget introduced in October 
2013, for instance, would see jobseekers’ allowance for those aged under 25 
fall from €144 per week to €100, with those 25 and over facing a reduction 
from €188 to €144 (Collins and Murphy, 2016). These cuts were an explicit 
attempt on the part of the Irish government to give the jobless ‘greater 
incentives to take up employment’, a strategy that was complemented by 
the introduction of ‘activation’ policies designed to monitor and sanction 
those deemed to not be pursuing work with sufficient vigour. As pressure 
grew on the unemployed to take positions previously considered financially 
untenable, the inevitable impact was to depress wages across the labour 
8 C r i t i c a l  S o c i a l  P o l i c y  00(0)
market but especially among those on lower incomes. This downward pres-
sure would be compounded briefly by the introduction of a €1 reduction in 
the hourly national minimum wage. Even in the context of a widespread 
assault on social protection in Ireland, this move provoked such controversy 
that it had to be withdrawn just five months later.
The text of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ struck with the troika 
documents vividly, therefore, the commitment of the Irish government to 
the austerity agenda of radically cutting public spending and driving down 
labour costs. In the eyes of its many powerful admirers, it was precisely the 
unwavering commitment of the Irish state to these unpopular policies that 
laid the ground for an economic revival that vindicates their insistence that 
there simply is no alternative to the hard course of austerity. While this read-
ing of what has happened in Ireland since the crash has gained widespread 
traction, it really does not stand up to close examination. When we turn 
to address what specifically lies behind the recent reversal in the country’s 
economic fortunes, it soon becomes apparent that the widely celebrated Irish 
‘recovery’ owes ‘little, if anything’ (Brazys and Regan, 2017: 412) to the pre-
scriptions of the austerity school.
The era of global economic crisis has compounded the impression that 
there exist, in effect, two discrete economies in Ireland. The onset of the reces-
sion had a devastating impact on indigenous Irish business, with investment 
rates initially falling by two thirds and unemployment levels soaring (Allen 
and O’Boyle, 2013: 37). In those sectors of the economy where multinational 
corporations predominate, in contrast, one might be forgiven for thinking that 
the Celtic Tiger remained in rude health. Since the crash, the significance of the 
transnational businesses operating in Ireland has grown apace. The tax evasion 
strategies in which they engage ensure, as we saw earlier, that the contribu-
tion of multinational corporations to the Irish economy is in certain respects 
fictitious. In other regards, however, it is very real indeed. Foreign companies 
employ 174,000 people in Ireland – a quarter of them in the high tech ICT 
sector – and are responsible for a quite remarkable 90% of all the goods and ser-
vices that leave Irish shores (Wickham and Bobek, 2016). Over the course of the 
recession, as indigenous companies contracted and shed labour, the primarily 
American multinationals based in Ireland expanded their levels of investment, 
employment and exports. It is entirely predictable, then, that the impetus for 
the recent upturn in the Irish economy should have come principally from these 
overseas companies.
The apparent success of the multinational corporations operating in Ire-
land might be said to pose serious questions for those who have advanced the 
case for austerity. Among the central orthodoxies that have reigned through-
out the global economic recession has been the insistence that a return to 
growth would require greater ‘competitiveness’ within labour markets (Blyth, 
2013). When we examine the country widely considered to have recovered 
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most successfully from the crash, however, a rather different picture emerges. 
It becomes apparent that the prime movers of the Irish economic revival have 
not been companies that have radically reduced labour costs but rather those 
that have substantially raised wages. While most Irish workers who managed 
to remain in employment during the crisis would, as we document later, see 
their disposable incomes tumble for a time, the multinational sector would 
dramatically reverse this trend. Between 2011 and 2015, for instance, the 
cosmopolitan workforce in the ICT sector where foreign companies predomi-
nate saw their wages increase by 15.3% (Storey, 2015). It is clear, then, that 
the parts of the Irish economy that have driven its vaunted ‘recovery’ are those 
where, in the main, wage levels are relatively high and rising and where per-
manent employment is the norm.
It should also be acknowledged that the surge in foreign direct invest-
ment that lies behind the recent economic upturn in Ireland has a very 
specific place of origin. Over the course of the crisis, the US government 
issued vast quantities of dollars in order not only to bail out ailing financial 
and other corporations but also to provide a stimulus to the wider American 
economy. This strategy of ‘quantitative easing’ was also employed in a Euro-
pean context. However, the prohibition on the European Central Bank mon-
etising member state debt prompted it to exclude from the scheme countries 
such as the Irish Republic that had entered into ‘bailout’ arrangements with 
the troika institutions (Varoufakis, 2016). While the ‘quantitative easing’ 
measures introduced within the European Union would, therefore, bring 
little benefit to the Irish economy, those implemented across the Atlantic 
would, ironically, prove the source of an unanticipated windfall. Brazys and 
Regan (2016: 27) suggest, for instance, that the funds released by the US 
Federal Reserve facilitated 300 more new investment projects by American 
multinational corporations in Ireland than in all the other ‘PIIGS’ com-
bined. It appears then that the recent return to economic growth in an Irish 
context owes rather less to the contractionary fiscal measures imposed by 
Brussels and Frankfurt than to certain expansionary, essentially Keynesian, 
policies pursued by Washington.
When we look more closely at the sources of the recent growth in the Irish 
economy, therefore, the assertion that Ireland’s ‘recovery’ derives specifically 
from its adherence to the strictures of the austerity model begins to appear 
rather threadbare. The turn in Ireland’s economic fortunes has its origins not 
in occupational sectors where wages have been eroded but rather in those 
where well-paid and secure employment are standard. Moreover, the recent 
surge in the national accounts has been the outcome not of ‘fiscal consolida-
tion’ but rather of a massive expansion in public spending, albeit in another 
country entirely. It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that the ‘recovery’ at 
work within the Irish economy is likely to have occurred not because of the 
prescriptions of the austerity school but rather in spite of them.
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Distorting the benefits of the ‘recovery’
The final distortion associated with the discourse of ‘recovery’ that we shall 
discuss here centres on how the benefits from the recent apparent economic 
upturn have been distributed across Irish society. Those who have made the 
case for austerity have emphasised that its punitive measures would in time 
facilitate a return to a prosperity that would enhance the lives of all. The 
area in which the remedial claims made for austerity appear most plausible 
is the labour market. At the onset of the crisis, the number out of work 
in Ireland increased dramatically as a series of indigenous companies col-
lapsed, and the national unemployment rate would peak in 2012 at 16% 
(Collins and Murphy, 2016). In the period since, job creation has gradu-
ally gathered pace and the proportion of people unable to find work cur-
rently stands at 5.3% (Central Statistics Office, 2018a). The swift decline 
in the jobless figures over recent years has been broadly positive and rep-
resents the most convincing evidence advanced by champions of the Irish 
‘recovery’. It is important, however, to look beyond the headline figures for 
aggregate job creation and examine more closely the new forms of employ-
ment currently being created in Ireland. When we do so, a picture emerges 
that is rather less positive than the dominant narrative of ‘recovery’ would 
have us believe.
When discussing their record on job creation, Irish politicians often 
highlight prestigious recent investments made by leading multinational con-
cerns. Employment opportunities in those areas where foreign companies pre-
dominate, as we noted earlier, continued to expand even through the recession 
and that pattern has been sustained in the period of economic ‘recovery’. The 
creation of additional well-paid positions in ICT companies was particularly 
instrumental in ensuring that wage levels in the private sector continued to 
rise even at the height of the crisis, with a 7% increase registered between 
2010 and 2015 (Taft, 2016b). While the high tech sector dominated by mul-
tinational capital has certainly been the driving force behind the revival of 
Ireland’s economic fortunes, it is important to remember that relatively few 
of the new jobs created lately have come in this area. Indeed, of the 200,000 
positions created since the jobless rate peaked in 2012, only 14,000 were in 
the ICT sector (Central Statistics Office, 2017a). Looking more closely at the 
data, it emerges that most of the jobs that have come on stream in recent 
years have been in less glamorous occupations than those provided by the 
high tech giants clustered in Dublin’s Silicon Docks. More than half of the 
new positions created since 2012 have in fact fallen into just three catego-
ries, namely those of agriculture, construction, and accommodation and food 
services (Central Statistics Office, 2017a). The bulk of the jobs being created 
during the ‘recovery’ are, in other words, in occupational categories where 
wages have been low traditionally and continue to be so.
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While incomes across the private sector did continue to rise even through 
the recession, this trend is reversed once we remove professionals and busi-
ness people from the calculations. In the period between 2010 and 2015, for 
instance, the net income of manual workers in Ireland declined by €38 per 
week (Taft, 2016a). In the last couple of years, wages have admittedly begun 
to grow again finally. These increases have, however, mainly been quite mod-
est. In the year to the third quarter of 2017, for instance, the weekly wages of 
construction workers grew by only €3.07 and those of people working in the 
accommodation and food sector rose a mere €4.81 (Central Statistics Office, 
2017b). These marginal recent gains may be welcome but they serve little to 
alter the fundamentally dispiriting realities of the contemporary Irish labour 
market (Dukelow and Kennett, 2018). While the recent spell of sustained job 
creation may appear overwhelmingly positive, it has in fact merely confirmed 
the status of Ireland as western Europe’s principal low wage economy (Unite 
the union, 2016). At a time when public debate is dominated by talk of 
renewed prosperity, it needs to be borne in mind that almost half of all Irish 
workers earn less than €25,000 per annum (O’Connor and Staunton, 2015). 
It is tempting to speculate as to how anyone, let alone so many, can subsist 
on such wage levels in a society where the cost of living runs at 20% above 
the EU average (O’Connor and Staunton, 2015) and where rents are now 30% 
above even the astronomical levels of the Celtic Tiger era (Hamilton, 2018).
A closer reading of the Irish labour market suggests, then, that the recent 
period of economic growth has brought rather fewer benefits than mainstream 
commentators often insist. Indeed, we might go a little further here and sug-
gest that the era of ‘recovery’ not merely has failed to improve the lives of a 
broad section of the Irish population but has in fact, in certain crucial respects 
at least, made them rather worse. The logic behind this seeming paradox 
becomes most apparent once we address the vagaries of the Irish property 
market. During the crisis, the Irish state acted to socialise the private debts 
not only of the banks but also of that small band of property developers who 
had been their principal clients. In fact, the Dublin government even created 
two ‘bad banks’ specifically to deal with the distressed debts of the real estate 
speculators who were among the principal authors of Ireland’s economic 
misfortunes. Established in 2009, the National Assets Management Agency 
(NAMA) paid the banks €32 billion to acquire loans nominally worth €74 
billion originally taken out by 779 developers (Byrne, 2016). Two years later, 
the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) was founded in order to man-
age the loan books of two recently nationalised bodies that had been notori-
ously profligate creditors during the Celtic Tiger boom – Anglo Irish Bank 
and Irish Nationwide Building Society.
Since 2013, the Irish state has sought to revive a property market whose 
collapse was both symptom and cause of the country’s ignominious economic 
decline. As part of this strategy, the Dublin authorities have placed growing 
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pressure on Ireland’s twin ‘bad banks’ to dispose of their portfolios rather 
sooner than they had anticipated, requiring them to sell at relatively low 
prices and even to provide the credit to facilitate some sales. The beneficiaries 
of these skewed market conditions have been a small number of powerful 
private equity firms and hedge funds based principally in the United States. 
These global ‘vulture funds’ have used the ‘fire sale’ initiated by the Dublin 
government to buy up vast quantities of distressed assets and almost over-
night have become major players in the Irish property market. Over the last 
five years, global equity firms have purchased 90,000 properties and become 
creditors on 48,000 mortgages (Hearne, 2017).
An immediate impact of the arrival of the ‘vulture funds’ in the Irish 
property market has been inevitably to inflate official statistics on economic 
performance, creating the impression that their influence is essentially benev-
olent. Indeed, one economist has suggested that the purchases made by these 
private equity firms were primarily instrumental in Ireland’s first spasm of 
economic growth after the crash, the seemingly positive 5% rise in GDP 
registered in 2014 (Gurdgiev, 2015). While the effect of these vast finan-
cial corporations on estimates of Irish economic performance might well be 
benign, their impact on Irish society has been entirely otherwise. The numer-
ous distressed loans and properties that ‘vulture funds’ have bought recently 
mean that they exercise enormous influence over the lives of many ordinary 
people. In short order, these powerful financial corporations have become the 
creditors and landlords to several hundred thousand Irish citizens. The dan-
gers latent in this new and deeply asymmetrical state of affairs was evinced 
starkly in the spring of 2016 when the global investment company Goldman 
Sachs purchased a distressed loan which gave it control of an entire housing 
development in Tyrrelstown, north-west Dublin, and promptly issued evic-
tion notices to all of its residents, more than 200 families in total (O’Connor, 
2016). This incident illustrates all too clearly the dangers of a strategy that 
has seen the state and the financial institutions it bailed out place a great 
many ordinary citizens in the position of having vulture funds as their credi-
tors, their landlords and, ultimately perhaps, their bailiffs.
Initially, at least, the Irish government’s strategy of seeking to revive the 
imploded national property market would appear to have been a remarkable 
success. The inducements issued by the ‘bad banks’ have drawn global pri-
vate equity firms to Ireland on an unprecedented scale. In 2016, for example, 
no fewer than one in three of all properties sold in the country was bought 
by investors (Hearne, 2017: 80). The heightened demand occasioned by the 
arrival of some of the world’s largest finance houses has inevitably prompted 
steep growth in house prices, which are now 75% above their 2013 low (Bee-
sley, 2018). In mainstream commentary, the revival of the Irish property mar-
ket is often read as a key barometer of economic progress. For those home 
owners who found themselves mired in negative equity at the height of the 
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crash, rising house prices are likely to be welcome indeed. The impact of the 
new property boom has, however, proved rather less advantageous for many 
other Irish citizens. In February 2015, the Central Bank introduced more 
stringent lending criteria in relation to mortgages, with the effect of freez-
ing out many younger and first time buyers already struggling to compete 
in a property market being inflated rapidly by international investors. As 
the number able to own their home has declined – the proportion has fallen 
10% in the decade since the crash (Hearne, 2017) – the pressure has grown 
on the rental market at a time when the housing stock has remained static. 
The predictable outcome has been a steep rise in rents, exemplified in the 
national capital where renting a home currently averages almost €2,000 a 
month, some €500 higher than at the end of the last boom (Hamilton, 2018).
While the impact of spiraling rents has been widespread among those 
900,000 people who are currently private sector tenants, it has been felt with 
particular force among the most marginalised sections of Irish society. The 
rising cost of renting a home places even greater strain on the already meagre 
resources of the young, migrants, single parents and low-income households 
(Hearne, 2017). The most insidious expression of the growing pressure on 
these vulnerable groups has been the acceleration of Ireland’s homelessness 
crisis. At precisely the moment that Ireland was beginning to register once 
more ostensibly phenomenal rates of economic growth, the number of its 
citizens unable to find a home was starting to spike sharply. In the period 
between 2014 and 2018, for instance, the volume of Irish people finding 
themselves homeless more than trebled. At present, there are 9,968 people 
without a home in Ireland, of whom 3,811 are children (Focus Ireland, 2018). 
These sobering data offer a timely reminder of the insidious nature of the sta-
tistics that often dominate mainstream commentaries on matters of political 
economy. While the numbers that make the headlines may well suggest that 
we are now in a period of ‘recovery’ in the Irish economy, this does not neces-
sarily represent good news for all of those who happen to live in Irish society.
Conclusion
The praise that a host of powerful global figures has lavished on Ireland over 
recent years might be said then to misrepresent what is in fact happening in 
the country. While the discourse of ‘recovery’ entails a sequence of ideological 
distortions, the most crucial of these depicts the ostensible return of prosper-
ity as advantageous to all sections of Irish society. The recent turn in Ireland’s 
economic fortunes may well have brought many benefits but these have, how-
ever, been neither universal nor evenly distributed. There are certain sections 
of Irish society that have not seen their living standards improve during the 
era of ‘recovery’ and indeed there are some for whom the period has marked a 
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profound deterioration in their life circumstances. While it is not possible to 
place a precise number on those left behind during the current spate of eco-
nomic growth, it seems reasonable to suggest that they form at the very least 
a very substantial minority of Ireland’s 4.8 million population, one that has 
been affected adversely by the confluence of three debilitating social processes.
First, the recent economic upturn has not improved greatly the living 
conditions of the poorest sections of Irish society. Over the period of the 
‘recovery’ official levels of poverty have remained remarkably stable and only 
in the last year have these metrics – with the notable exception of the ‘at risk 
of poverty’ rate – begun to move in a more positive direction (Central Statis-
tics Office, 2018c). It remains to be seen if these modest declines will form 
a trend over time but it is worth noting that current poverty rates remain 
greater than before the onset of the global economic crisis. A comparison 
of the most recent available data (2017) and those garnered in the year the 
recession began (2008) illustrates that all three of the key metrics of poverty 
are rather higher now than they were a decade ago: ‘material deprivation’ 
(18.8% compared to 13.8%); ‘at risk of poverty’ (15.7% and 14.4%); and 
‘consistent poverty’ (6.7% and 4.2%). In a country registering the fastest 
economic growth in Europe, there are still 760,000 people living in poverty, 
230,000 of whom are children (Social Justice Ireland, 2018). The sheer scale 
of the problem has prompted even newspapers not ordinarily known for their 
social radicalism to suggest recently that the ‘recovery’ has compounded the 
existence of ‘two Irelands’ (Irish Independent, 2018).
Second, the recent apparent turn in the fortunes of the Irish Republic has 
affirmed its status as a low-wage economy. While an impressive number of 
jobs has been created in Ireland since the end of the troika ‘bailout’, these have 
tended to be concentrated, as noted earlier, in sectors where both remuneration 
and protection are poor. At present, one in five men and three in ten women 
working full-time in the Irish Republic have jobs characterised by ‘low pay’ 
(Collins and Murphy, 2016). The high incidence of low incomes among the 
Irish workforce finds reflection in perhaps the most remarkable figure among 
the poverty statistics released recently by the Irish state. According to the 
Central Statistics Office, there are now 109,000 employees in the country 
who meet the criteria for poverty (Social Justice Ireland, 2018). The dramatic 
scale of the ‘working poor’ is in part a reflection of a further insidious social 
process that more perhaps than any other exemplifies the dark side of Ireland’s 
widely vaunted ‘recovery’.
Third, the era of renewed economic growth has of course been driven by 
a property boom that has become especially acute in the private rental sector. 
In the five years since the end of the troika ‘bailout,’ salaries have on average 
grown by almost 9%, an impressive figure but one that pales in comparison to 
the 70% rise in rents over the same period (Central Statistics Office, 2018b). 
The rampant inflation occurring in the rental sector means that most of the 
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900,000 people who hold tenancies in Ireland have in effect experienced a 
dramatic fall in their real disposable income during the ‘recovery’ years. Even 
those on what in the recent past would have been deemed generous salaries are 
not exempt from these pressures. Professionals living in Dublin and unable 
to meet the newly stringent criteria for mortgage approval, for instance, can 
now expect to pay more than half their nominally substantial incomes to land-
lords (Reddan, 2017). The impact of Ireland’s overheated housing market has, 
however, been felt with especial gravity among those lower income groups 
that have traditionally been over-represented within the private rental sector. 
As rents have spiked during the ‘recovery’, the likes of low-waged workers, 
migrants and single parents have seen ever larger portions of their income 
passed straight to landlords. This has led to forms of material deprivation that 
have been documented occasionally by journalists investigating ‘generation 
rent’ but have yet, as Nugent (2018) notes, to be captured adequately in offi-
cial poverty metrics. For a growing number of people it has, inevitably, become 
simply impossible to cover the rent each month and the predictable outcome 
has been a dramatic rise in the number finding themselves without a home. Of 
all the statistics that beg questions of the familiar discourse of ‘recovery’ there 
can be none quite so telling as the fact that there is currently a record total of 
almost 10,000 people homeless in Ireland (Focus Ireland, 2018).
It would seem reasonable, then, to suggest that at the very least there is 
in Ireland a substantial minority of the population that has experienced the 
recent period of economic growth not as a time of ‘recovery’ but rather as one 
of ongoing, at times escalating, material crisis. Among this broad swathe of 
people we might include the three quarters of a million subject to levels of 
poverty that barely seem to abate, the half a million that work in poorly paid 
and poorly protected jobs, the majority of the almost one million who see ever 
larger segments of their often meagre incomes consumed by ever escalating 
rents. In the everyday lives of these sections of Irish society, the era of crisis 
and austerity is one that has never really ended. Until it does, it might be 
prudent to consider the discourse of ‘recovery’ that pervades the discussion of 
contemporary Ireland as, at best, a little premature.
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